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JEAN-PIERRE  CABESTAN
This is a very useful overview of both the history and the current stateof China-Taiwan relations. The 16th title of a new collection called“China Today,” this short volume is mainly aimed at informing the
general public interested in the most striking features of what is now the
second world economy and power. However, written by a recognised expert
of the relations across the Taiwan Strait, it constitutes both a comprehensive
and highly reliable exposé of Taiwan’s past, its unique trajectory, and its
closer but still difficult relationship with China. Moreover, it uses newly de-
classified materials that underscore the complexity of the issue as well as
the ambiguities attached to the positions of each stakeholder, namely
China, Taiwan, and the United States. Consequently, students of Chinese af-
fairs interested in better comprehending cross-Strait relations and Taiwan’s
future are strongly advised to read this book. 
Organised in eight brief chapters, Steven Goldstein’s work first reminds
the reader about Taiwan’s past, its late inclusion in the Manchu Empire
(1683), the 50-year Japanese colonisation (1895-1945), and more impor-
tantly, what the United States (and Japan) still consider its “unsettled sta-
tus” in spite of its claimed return to the Republic of China (ROC) in 1945.
It then adroitly summarises “cross-Strait politics without relations” during
the Cold War and what has changed and not changed in Washington’s
stance on Taiwan since Nixon’s trip in 1972. Similarly, it highlights the am-
biguities of the Sino-US normalisation in 1979 and the 1982 third commu-
niqué (on the reduction of US arms sales to Taiwan), as well as the
importance of the April 1979 Taiwan Relations Act and the refusal of all US
governments, including the Carter administration, for that matter (p. 66),
to endorse the idea that Taiwan is part of the People’s Republic of China. 
While for obvious reasons Washington looms large in this book, China and
Taiwan also gives much space to Taiwanese politics. It rightly underscores
what it calls “the challenges of a democratic Taiwan,” the impact of democ-
ratisation, and the quest for a better statehood both on cross-Strait relations
(the missile crisis) and Taipei-Washington relations (a more robust security
engagement and military cooperation). Likewise, the Chen Shui-bian (and
Democratic Progressive Party, DPP) presidency (2000-2008) is clearly
analysed, contrasting the first two years of relative moderation with the
next six years of Taiwanese identity “assertiveness” (my own wording) but
also growing rapprochement between the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Chi-
nese Communist Party (CCP). Entitled “Satisfying Washington and Beijing,”
the chapter devoted to the Ma Ying-jeou presidency shows both the
achievements and the limits of the rapprochement initiated by the KMT
and supported by most Taiwanese, at least until 2014 and the Sunflower
Movement. This chapter also demonstrates that China won’t be happy as
long as Taiwan – one of its top “core interests” – capitulates and embraces
political negotiations leading to reunification. As a result, the US cannot ex-
tricate itself from the key role it plays in this dispute. 
The two final chapters present the two well-known paradoxical pillars of
the relationship across the Taiwan Strait: on the one hand, a deepening but
highly asymmetrical economic interdependence, and on the other hand, a
lingering and unsolvable security tension that has forced the US to adopt a
“dual deterrence” strategy (to deter a Chinese unprovoked attack as well
as a Taiwanese declaration of independence).
There are probably choices and developments in Goldstein’s book that
other scholars studying cross-Strait relations may object to. For instance,
he does not adequately emphasise the close connection between US-China
normalisation and Deng Xiaoping’s adoption of a policy of “peaceful reuni-
fication” towards Taiwan, as opposed to “peaceful liberation,” a formula still
used by Hua Guofeng in late 1978 (p. 53). This linkage is important because
it will later justify the decision made by the Clinton administration to dis-
regard (or de facto freeze) the application of the 1982 third US-China com-
muniqué as Beijing decides to remilitarise the Taiwan Strait. Another
criticism can be made regarding Lee Teng-hui’s decision in 1999 to qualify
cross-Strait relations as state-to-state relations: it was more the result of
talks held by the Strait Exchange Foundation (SEF) and the Association for
the Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) in Shanghai in 1998 than
the division between the Clinton administration and Congress (p. 95) that
explained Lee’s initiative: he did not want to open “political talks” with
China, knowing too well where it might lead. 
One can also question whether the Chen years were “a period of high dan-
ger” (the title of Chapter 5). Goldstein tends to dismiss Chen’s caution and
Beijing’s unaccommodating position in the first two years of his presidency,
the latter being the main reason for Chen’s change of mind and strategy in
summer 2002. More generally, looking back at these years as another DPP
administration starts in 2016 under the presidency of Tsai Ing-wen, one
wonders what Chen tried and managed to achieve. In 2006 he terminated
the National Unification Council, an institution established before Taiwan’s
democratisation and the political legitimacy of which was questionable, but
never actually challenged the “one China nature” of the Republic of China’s
Constitution (as mentioned on p. 102). In addition, regarding the so-called
“92 Consensus,” the author does not adopt enough critical distance from
this concept, coined by the KMT’s Su Chi in 2000: in 1992, the SEF and the
ARATS reached an ambiguous compromise rather than a “consensus” re-
garding “one China” (p. 103), and as Tsai steps in as the new ROC president,
this problem remains unsolved. Finally, while China and Taiwan does a good
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job tracing the initial statement in 2005 of Hu Jintao’s slightly more flexible
policy towards the island, it does not mention the important change
adopted by the CCP in October 2007, which elevated the priority of the
“peaceful development” of cross-Strait relations (as opposed to “peaceful
reunification”), an idea that goes back to the first point of Beijing’s 17 May
2004 seven-point statement (1) and means that Beijing can accept the status
quo for the time being. It is a policy priority that has not been questioned
by Xi Jinping, even if the new Chinese president has demonstrated more
impatience regarding leaving the issue unresolved for future generations. 
China and Taiwan closes just before the November 2015 Xi-Ma summit
in Singapore and Taiwan’s January 2016 presidential and legislative elections.
However, it includes all the ingredients that observers need to be aware of
in order to understand the current state and uncertain future of cross-Strait
relations. A tour de force, as we say in English… and in French.
z Jean-Pierre Cabestan is the head of the Department of Government
and International Studies at Hong Kong Baptist University
(cabestan@hkbu.edu.hk).
1. Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United States of America website, “Taiwan Affairs
Office Issues Statement on Current Cross-Straits Relations,” 17 May 2004, www.china-
embassy.org/eng/zt/twwt/t111117.htm (accessed on 27 April 2016).
parative context. However, the stylisation of conduct is double-edged: with
the state set as a “principal” controlling its “agents,” it appears disembodied
and monolithic. While the book takes into account the different levels of
the Chinese administration – this selective discipline applying to the central
as well as provincial, municipal, and local levels – it is not quite clear who
at each level acts as the “principal.” Is it the Party secretary? Or is it a larger
leadership, including the divergent interests within it? This is a fundamental
question, as it would help determine the intentionality behind the discipli-
nary actions. This lack of clarity in defining the “principal” thus leads to a
certain imprecision as regards the objectives. For Cai, the state’s aim is to
guarantee its effectiveness as well as its legitimacy among the public. This
legitimacy concept is only vaguely defined, as a sort of moral hegemony of
the state, and it is therefore difficult to grasp its motivations and link them
with the interests of a particular actor. Nevertheless, the numerous cases
and mechanisms detailed in the book facilitate an understanding of what
underlies the selectivity in the state’s discipline.
Two chapters bring detailed focus on the types of undisciplined behaviour
that have grown in the contemporary Chinese state and on the political
logic that explains selective and differentiated discipline. Cai pointedly notes
the large number of violations reported by citizens’ petitions (about 60,000
a year in Guangdong during the 1990s, p. 23) and the vast variety of acts
in question, ranging from abuse of power to corruption, as well as the pur-
suit of irresponsible projects or a lifestyle deemed immoral. The lack of cor-
relation between the number of complaints and the number of cadres
hauled up shows the selectivity of investigations linked to a singular political
logic. Whereas before the 1980s, the Chinese Party-state mainly relied on
major political campaigns to bring its cadres in line, a dedicated mechanism
has since been set up. In the early 2000s, nearly 300,000 cadres were in
charge of internal discipline (p. 49). The model of the Party’s Central Com-
mission for Discipline Inspection, re-established in 1978, was replicated at
the local level. A decentralised system of inspections was then established,
with each level of the administration being in charge of disciplining the next
lower level. In Cai’s view, two main variables are considered in deciding to
punish an agent or not: the seriousness of the consequences and the agent’s
level of responsibility. While this seems self-evident, this approach appears
to be put in doubt by numerous cases that on the contrary point to the ex-
istence of a variety of questions being considered before arriving at a deci-
sion to punish an agent: Has the transgression been made public by the
media? What factional support does the agent enjoy? What effect would
such punishment have on the administration’s image and agents’ morale?…
Thus the agent’s responsibility appears to be a highly malleable element
depending on the result sought by superiors and the information obtained,
or not, by the press, which remains on a tight leash. Power struggles over
defining the objectives of the discipline process are not to be underesti-
mated, while the functional rationality of the state that wants to punish an
agent for his transgression is not to be overestimated, as Cai tends to in the
book.
In the next two chapters, the author plunges into granularity by differen-
tiating the types of transgressions and thus punishments. Focusing at the
outset on professional errors linked to the exercise of a function, as opposed
to cases of corruption, he notes the large panoply of punishments possible,
and the flexibility the state enjoys. By concentrating on cases of social con-
flict management, Cai brings out the complexity of elements at play in judg-
ing a professional error and those responsible. A cadre could well be held
guilty of being responsible for a protest, but if that were not the case, he
JÉRÔME DOYON
This book by Yongshun Cai, professor at the Hong Kong University of Sci-ence and Technology, is concerned with the ways in which the ChineseParty-state ensures internal discipline. Presenting the issue in the formal
framework of the theory of agency, he stresses the problems of information
asymmetry and moral hazard at the heart of the relationship between the
state and its agents. As the state is not omniscient, it does not always know
what its agents do or will do, and this could lead the latter to adopt behaviours
other than those expected in implementing public policies. In this situation,
the state is obliged to adopt methods for disciplining its agents while taking
into account possible political costs. By targeting its own cadres, the Party-
state risks alienating the main supporters of a regime not based on popular
elections. Keeping this risk in mind, as well as its own limited resources, the
state can hardly afford to attack all its undisciplined cadres and might be
obliged to be selective with rewards and punishments. Thus the state does
not need to punish all violations, but only needs to make agents aware of the
high level of risk they face and to induce fear of this uncertain discipline. 
Major issues regarding the functioning of the Chinese state and its efforts
at formalising the conduct of its actors are considered in this work in a com-
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